Perotti v Collyer Bristow - Restraining the Vexatious Litigant
Perotti v Collyer Bristow - Restraining the Vexatious Litigant
The Court of Appeal has reigned in another vexatious litigant. The case belongs to the developing post-Bhamjee (Bhamjee v Forsdick (No 2) [2003] EWCA Civ 1113) movement where the buzzwords of “proportionality” and “resources” stand ready to strike at litigants who bring unmeritorious claims.
The unhappy tale leading to this decision is set out in detail in Brooke LJ’s leading judgment. The action arose out of the way in which Messrs Collyer-Bristow had conducted an administration action, on behalf of Mr Perotti, in relation to his uncle’s estate. Lindsay J found that there had been no professional negligence. In the Court of Appeal, Mr Perotti made thirteen applications for permission to appeal from Lindsay J’s judgment and various rulings that he had made in the course of the trial. He also applied for a reconsideration of Master Venne’s refusal to direct that transcripts of parts of the trial be prepared out of the public purse.
After refusing all of Mr Perotti’s applications because they were “all totally devoid of merit”, the Court of Appeal turned their attention to redoubling previous efforts to restrain him. In doing so, they gave effect to their envisaged intentions in Bhamjee of a progressive, incremental approach to managing the vexatious:
“The possibilities are unlimited. What is important is that the remedy should always be proportionate to mischief that needs remedying.”
Mr Perotti had had three previous civil restraint orders made against him, the first of which dated back to 1997. In April 2003, an extended civil restraint order was imposed upon him. Brooke LJ built upon this history to propose several variations (perhaps more accurately, “extensions”) to the existing extended civil restraint order. Most notably, one of these proposed layers was a direction that any other application made by Mr Perotti to the Court of Appeal in the next two years should only be considered on paper and that the decision made would be final. Brooke LJ considered that:
“The reason for making such a direction would be that the nuisance posed by Mr Perotti’s litigious activities is now so extreme that the court would be entitled to take this unusual step to protect its own processes and the interests of other litigants.”
If this step is unusual, their proposal to pass the papers to the Attorney General, for consideration of an order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 is even more remarkable. Under this provision, the High Court may order that a litigant may not commence proceedings in any court without the leave of the High Court, for an indefinite period. If leave is not granted, there is no right of appeal.
If in Bhamjee the Court of Appeal showed their armoury, in Perotti they have shown they will not flinch from using it. Brooke LJ sat in the Court of Appeal in both cases. It remains to be seen whether his colleagues share his zeal.